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People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, 
musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. The idea that these have 
something to teach them – that does not occur to them.  




It is widely assumed that there is a literary aspect to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
writings. Famously, Wittgenstein once wrote, “I think I summed up my 
position on philosophy when I said: one should really do philosophy as a 
poetic composition.”2 In this paper, I will focus on the question of how the 
alleged literariness of the Investigations contributes to its philosophical 
achievements. The main objective of this article is to argue for the relevance of 
viewing the literariness of Wittgenstein’s methodological procedures against 
the backdrop of the work of the Russian formalist Viktor Shklovsky. In ‘The 
Resurrection of the Word’ (1914) and ‘Art as Technique’ (1917), Shklovsky 
takes pains to make clear a way of differentiating between poetic and prosaic 
language. Importantly, the distinction between poetic (or literary) and prosaic 
discourses in Shklovsky’s treatment does not coincide with the distinction 
between the literary genres of poetry and prose. He pursues the question in 
discussing what it is to perceive a piece of prose in a poetic way. For 
Shklovsky, poetic and prosaic language have different functions. What is more, 
in Shklovsky’s work, we also find some interesting references to Tolstoy’s 
writings that may illuminate aspects of Wittgenstein’s literary way of 
philosophising. Famously, Wittgenstein was himself a devoted reader of 
Tolstoy’s writings. 
My discussion will be prefaced by some remarks about how the question 
about the literariness in Wittgenstein has been responded to in, among others, 
Stanley Cavell and Marjorie Perloff. For the most part, I find myself in 
sympathy with Cavell’s thoughts on this issue. Even so, a worry that I want to 
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articulate in this paper is that he focuses chiefly on Wittgenstein’s aphorisms 
(and to some extent his parables), at least in the essays that I consider here. I 
take it that Cavell’s perspective ought to be expanded.3 Perloff, on the other 
hand, focuses on Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations in trying to clarify 
the role of the literary in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Even though I agree 
with her view that his grammatical investigations should be taken into 
consideration when we discuss the literary dimension of Wittgenstein’s 
writings, I do oppose her overtly cognitive take on the issue. 
I would like to point out that my intention is neither to defend nor to 
give a thorough exposition of Shklovsky’s formalist and rather essentialist 
theory of the literary. Neither is my aim to pin down a definition of the 
literariness of Wittgenstein’s later writings. As for the last point, I may put my 
reservation this way: I will not attempt to formulate some kind of aesthetics for 
the Investigations. This is something Cavell has (rightly, in my view) warned 
us against.4 What I will be urging is that the formalist standpoint, in particular 
as this is developed in Shklovsky, may open some interesting perspectives on 
Wittgenstein’s writings and thus illuminate how his style may contribute to 
some of the insights that we gain in dealing with his work. It is widely believed 
that Wittgenstein wanted his readers to reconceive their notion of philosophy 
and philosophical methods. The comparison with Shklovsky may help us see 
                                               
3 As for the distinction between poetry and other genres of literature, Wolfgang Huemer 
argues in the introduction to The Literary Wittgenstein, eds John Gibson and Wolfgang 
Huemer (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), that philosophers dealing with literature are 
usually interested in texts with narrative structures. He contends that the value of poetry is 
just as important. Through violating rules of meaning, poetry might explore and extend the 
limits of our language. However, both poetry- and narration-based literature draw attention 
to language itself. Literature can thus “illuminate our understanding of the workings of 
language; it can become a tool of grammatical investigations,” p. 6. According to Huemer, 
poetry and prose (for example, novels and short stories) fulfill this role in different ways. 
Literature based on narration, for example, gives us depictions of unusual episodes and 
circumstances that might help us acquire new perspectives on everyday practices and 
situations. In poetry, metaphors are developed that help us question and improve our way of 
expressing ourselves. Metaphors help us draw attention to our habitual perception of our 
surroundings. Thus, poetry too may help us acquire new perspectives. Nevertheless, it is 
unclear where Huemer sees Wittgenstein operating– within the domain of poetry or 
narrative fiction? As for Wittgenstein’s Investigations, he says that the new form of 
exposition is appropriate to “express his ideas and in general to convey philosophical 
information,” p. 2.  
4 Cf. Stanley Cavell, ‘The Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics of Itself’, in The Literary 
Wittgenstein, eds. John Gibson and Wolfgang Huemer (London; New York: Routledge, 
2004), p. 24. 
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how many of Wittgenstein’s reminders and remarks carry philosophical 
weight, without having to understand them as philosophical statements. 
 
Cavell and Perloff on Wittgenstein 
In ‘The Wittgensteinian Event,’ Cavell suggests that one of Wittgenstein’s 
ambitions for his Philosophical Investigations is to present perspicuous 
presentations. Cavell argues that this ambition is not only present in connection 
with his so-called “signature philosophical procedures” that he considers the 
grammatical investigations (and formal proofs) to constitute. His sense is that 
Wittgenstein’s aphorisms and parables also should be recognised as 
presentations in this mode.5 For Cavell, three things are important in this 
context: “The criteria I emphasise in identifying such instances as perspicuous 
is that they provide pleasure, that they compose a unity, and that they break off 
a line of thought.”6 Yet, for Cavell, there is an important difference between 
Wittgenstein’s signature philosophical procedures and his literary gestures.7 
Understanding Wittgenstein’s aphorisms requires aesthetic attention and 
sensibilities.8 Their composition demands a specific literary talent as well. 
They may, in other words, be much harder to take in than, for example, his 
depictions of language games. Interestingly, Cavell suggests that 
Wittgenstein’s literary gestures tend to bring the conversation to a halt. I take 
this to mean that, in contrast to the grammatical investigations, the literary 
gestures tend to slow down our reading and perception. My sense is that the 
same could be said of many of his grammatical remarks as well. This is 
something that will be further illuminated below.  
In Cavell, the important question is not what makes the aphorisms 
literary. It is taken for granted that they have such a quality. The question is 
how they contribute to Wittgenstein’s philosophising. Here is Cavell: “I 
describe what I am after as the Investigations’ everyday aesthetics of itself to 
register at once that I know of no standing aesthetic theory that promises help 
in understanding the literariness of the Investigations – I mean the literary 
conditions of its philosophical aims.”9 The aesthetic dimension of the 
Investigations must, as Cavell is suggesting in the same context, be considered 
                                               
5 Cf. Stanley Cavell, ‘The Wittgensteinian Event’, in Reading Cavell, eds Alice Crary and 
Sanford Shieh (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 23. 
6 Cavell, ‘The Wittgensteinian Event’, p. 26. 
7 For Cavell, examples of such gestures in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations are 
§§52; 107; 217; 268; 309 and pp. 178 and 224; see Cavell, ‘The Wittgensteinian Event’, p. 
24. 
8 Cavell, ‘Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics’, pp. 24-25.  
9 Cavell, ‘Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics’, p. 21. 
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in relation to its achievements and the way the work shapes our conception of 
philosophical problems and their solutions. His unwillingness to speak of an 
aesthetic theory that can help us understand the literariness of the 
Investigations notwithstanding, he wants to draw attention to the power of the 
aphoristic, the power it exercises on us. Cavell puts it this way: 
The power of the aphoristic is a function of its granting the appeal, 
even in a sense the reality, of the metaphysical. It is a mode of 
reflecting the clarity brought by grammatical methods, one that in 
itself, as itself, exhibits this clarity, together with a satisfaction or 
acknowledgement of the obscurity from which clarity comes.10 
Through his aphorisms, Wittgenstein is able to give voice to and recognise the 
torment and obscurity from which our philosophical problems arise. The 
aphorisms speak to us in a way that brings acknowledgement of the depth of 
our philosophical problems and how they exercise a strong grip on us. Cavell 
says that they manage to bring about an experience of pleasure, of liberation 
(from a mood, which seems to have a therapeutic dimension), and an 
experience of anxiety about exposure. The last point, I take it, relates to our 
fear of taking wrong steps, that is, of being misled by phoney voices.11 We 
should here note that from Cavell’s vantage point, the aphorisms and parables 
in Wittgenstein are capable of eliciting responses in the reader that are only 
reachable through their literary form.  
Thus, although we are not presented with an aesthetic theory in Cavell, 
we are indeed presented with a view of how Wittgenstein’s aphorisms affect 
the reader, what methodical role they are supposed to perform, and how form 
and content are to be considered inseparable. For Cavell, it is essential to point 
out that the very claim about the expressiveness of the aphoristic is not 
something that can be demonstrated, since its own perspicuousness rests upon 
experience.12 
Perloff’s take on this issue is very different from Cavell’s. She is 
concerned with how the literary or poetic in Wittgenstein is to be understood. 
Perloff asks us to take into consideration the fact that many poetic expressions 
do not seem translatable, at least not in a satisfying way. According to Perloff, 
we very often think of the poetic as something not translatable. A slippage of 
meaning is very often involved in translations of poetry and other forms of 
literature. Thus, provided that we want to consider Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical procedures as poetic, it is, according to Perloff, interesting to 
note that problems related to untranslatability seldom arise in connection with 
                                               
10 Cavell, ‘Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics’, p 29. 
11 Cavell, ‘Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics’, p 29. 
12 Cavell, ‘Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics’, p 29. 
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understanding his work. She says that Wittgenstein is actually read around the 
world without scholars worrying much about their reading translations of his 
work. This might be correct. In my view, though, the urgency of the complex 
issue of translatability that Perloff raises is related to our philosophical 
sensibilities and our notion of Wittgenstein should be read. In the great bulk of 
commentaries on Wittgenstein’s Investigations and later philosophy, there are 
plentiful examples of philosophical theses and doctrines being extrapolated 
from his writings. Construals of the alleged use-theory of meaning and the 
private language argument are both examples of such endeavours. The writers 
of these commentaries do insist more or less explicitly that the objective of 
their scholarly enterprises is to formulate the concealed theses and theories of 
Wittgenstein’s work. Due to the unusual and quirky style of his work, the lack 
of jargon and the absence of a traditional vocabulary of philosophy, this is 
regarded a difficult task that takes hermeneutical ingenuity to accomplish. Yet, 
if we do not take it that Wittgenstein attempted to expound theories and theses, 
but rather aimed at administering reminders that might help us see important 
aspects of phenomena in our lives, we might be more willing to accept that 
Wittgenstein’s words attain as it were different physiognomies in different 
languages. Thus, they may speak to us differently, something that may even 
affect the way we are involved in the philosophical questions. Famously, 
Wittgenstein himself was very concerned with this dimension of language.13  
According to Perloff, in inventing his aphorisms, Wittgenstein was first 
and foremost concerned with the “denotative properties” of his words. Here is 
Perloff: “In formulating his aphoristic propositions, Wittgenstein is not 
interested in connotation, nuance, or in word choice based on considerations of 
rhythm and sound, but in the uses of the denotative properties of words.”14 
However, this does not mean that Perloff thinks there are no problems 
whatsoever with how to translate Wittgenstein’s words. What she is driving at 
is that Wittgenstein’s writings are not untranslatable in the way, for example, 
the poetry of Rainer Marie Rilke and Robert Lowell are.15 In any case, the 
central question Perloff’s article seeks to answer is how Wittgenstein’s remarks 
can be taken as poetic when they are so stripped of the usual poetic trappings. 
She suggests a distinction between a poetic use of language that is based on 
                                               
13 See, for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1992), §§531-32, pp. 218-19.  
14 Marjorie Perloff, ‘“But Isn’t the Same at Least the Same?” Wittgenstein and the Question 
of Poetic Translatability’, in The Literary Wittgenstein, eds. John Gibson and Wolfgang 
Huemer (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 36. 
15 It should be pointed out that Perloff takes pains to discuss a number of instances 
exemplifying this kind of poetic untranslatability. 
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connotative and rhythmic qualities and a conceptual and abstract use of 
language. Wittgenstein’s philosophy belongs to the last category. However, 
this seems to prevent us from crediting Wittgenstein with any literary or poetic 
aspects. Not necessarily so. For Perloff, the poetic or artistic aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s writings should rather be seen against the backdrop of 
conceptual art. Perloff’s strategy is to consider his way of philosophising as a 
form of conceptual art. For her, Wittgenstein is the poet of thinking through 
language:  
In Wittgenstein’s practice, conceptual art begins with the 
investigation of grammar, the description of the actual relations 
between words and phrases in the larger unit in which they are 
embedded. The surface word order, of course, will vary from 
language to language, according to the rules that language prescribes 
for the relationship between parts of speech. But the basic 
relationship of parts of speech – nouns, verbs, adjectives, 
prepositions – to one another will remain the same.16 
If I understand Perloff correctly, she is arguing that the artistic dimension of 
Wittgenstein’s work is to be located in the ideas and conceptual relations to 
which his writings draw our attention. The material quality of his words is not 
important. Here is Perloff: 
The poetic, as I remarked earlier, is not, for Wittgenstein, a question 
of heightening, of removing language from its everyday use by 
means of appropriate troping or rhetorical device. Rather, what 
makes philosophy poetic is its potential for invention, its status as 
what we now call conceptual art – the art that, in Sol LeWitt’s 
words, “is made to engage the mind of the viewer rather than his 
eye” – or, more broadly speaking, his senses – the art, as it were, that 
tracks the process of thinking itself.17 
For the conceptual artist, though, the interest of a piece of art does not reside in 
the artistic treatment of some kind of material. The idea is that everyone could, 
on instruction, produce the material gesturing at the idea behind the artwork. 
As we see, this approach differs radically from Cavell’s, which argued that 
Wittgenstein’s style is internal to his philosophising, that they constitute a 
unity, and that literary sensibility is required to understand this unity. The 
strategy that Perloff pursues is to dematerialise Wittgenstein’s language. To 
her, the idea, the cognitive content, is what matters. She even quotes David 
Antin’s statement that Wittgenstein is “a poet of nearly pure cognition.”18  
                                               
16 Perloff, ‘Wittgenstein and Poetic Translatability’, p. 43. 
17 Perloff, ‘Wittgenstein and Poetic Translatability’, p. 43. 
18 Perloff, ‘Wittgenstein and Poetic Translatability’, p. 45. 
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To sum up my stance so far, my take on the issue of the literariness in 
the Investigations should not be seen as an overall rejection of Cavell’s view. 
My purpose is rather to widen the scope. Yet I do not think it is clear that we 
ought to draw a sharp line between the aphorisms and his grammatical 
investigations in discussing the literary achievements of the Investigations. As 
for Perloff, her treatment seems to undermine a literary interest in aphorisms 
altogether. Her issue about translatability raises interesting questions, but I 
think she too quickly rejects the poetic or literary achievements of the 
aphorisms in Wittgenstein. I do, however, welcome Perloff’s suggestion that 
we should focus more on Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations, although 
her thought that Wittgenstein should be seen as engaged in some kind of 
conceptual art seems to undermine his sense that philosophy should provide 
reminders that might help us see the familiar, might help us undermine 
philosophical problems, in Wittgenstein’s sense. The literary aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s writings do not only conspire to engage the mind of the reader, 
but also his senses. 
Nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the concepts 
we have than constructing fictitious ones.  
It’s only by thinking even more crazily than philosophers do that you 
can solve their problems.19  
 
Shklovsky and Wittgenstein 
For Shklovsky, when perception becomes routine and habitual, it also tends to 
become automatic.20 After we have perceived an object several times, 
Shklovsky argues, we only recognise it—instead of seeing it. Here is 
Shklovsky: “We do not sense the familiar, we do not see it, but recognise it.”21 
The object might be in front of us; we know about it, but we do not see it. 
What’s more, we have nothing significant to say about it. Wittgenstein’s notion 
that aspects of the phenomena we want to investigate become lost because we 
are so familiar with them is something that suggests an affinity between him 
and Shklovsky. Wittgenstein shares Shklovsky’s sense that our perceptions of 
our surroundings and the phenomena in front of us tend to lose their density 
when we are confronted with them every day. Take for instance the following 
                                               
19 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, pp. 74-75. 
20 Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, in Modern Criticism and Theory, ed. David Lodge 
(London; New York: Longman, 1988), p. 19. 
21 Viktor Shklovsky, ‘The Resurrection of the Word (1914)’, in Russian Formalism: A 
Collection of Articles and Texts in Translation, eds Stephen Bann and John E. Bowlt 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1973), pp. 41-42. 
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section from the Investigations and the two subsequent aphorisms from Culture 
and Value: 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden 
because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice 
something – because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real 
foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact 
has at some time struck him. And this means: we fail to be struck by 
what, once seen, is most striking and powerful.22 
 
How hard I find it to see what is right in front of my eyes!... 
God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of 
everyone’s eyes.23 
 
Shklovsky attempts to shed light on how readers perceive literary expressions, 
that is to say, how these induce in us a strengthened perception, both of the 
verbal expression and of what the expression is about. He is fascinated with the 
ways language is capable of shaping our perception. For Shklovsky, the crucial 
function of poetic devices is to slow down the perception and to create a vision 
of the object. It is important to note that the distinction between the prosaic and 
the poetic in Shklovsky is a matter of function, of whether it has been 
successfully created to remove the automatism of our perception. Moreover, 
whether a string of words has such a poetic force depends on such things as 
context and the expectations of the reader. Interestingly, in Zettel, we find 
Wittgenstein making a remark suggesting a similar view: “The way music 
speaks. Do not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the language 
of information, is not used in the language game of giving information.”24  
An important point in Shklovsky is that the difference between the 
language of prose and that of poetry must be contextually defined. He speaks 
in this connection of poetry as “roughened, impeded language,” which is 
something he dubs the principle of the “roughened form.” In some cases, the 
language of poetry comes near the language of prose. In discussing Pushkin’s 
trivial style, Shklovsky notes, “The usual poetic language for Pushkin’s 
contemporaries was the elegant style of Derzhavin; but Pushkin’s style, 
because it seemed trivial then, was unexpectedly difficult for them.”25 I think it 
is rewarding here to view Wittgenstein’s language and style as roughened and 
having an impeding function. It is supposed to slow down both the reading and 
                                               
22 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §129. 
23 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 39, p. 63. 
24 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, eds G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), §64. 
25 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 28. 
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our perception of the surroundings. The unusual and, in some respects, trivial 
style of his work, the absence of a traditional vocabulary of philosophy, is 
something that makes it difficult to come to terms with the work and its 
treatments of philosophical problems.  
In his best known article, “Art as technique,” Shklovsky expounds his 
view on the literary technique thus: “The technique of art is to make objects 
‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of 
perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and 
must be prolonged.”26 I think we actually should say that Shklovsky is 
discussing two different albeit related techniques in his paper or that we at least 
could say that there are two aspects to the technique of art he is addressing.27 
The first aspect is primarily related to the way our absorption of the literary 
expressions is slowed down on account of the impeding and roughening texture 
of the linguistic material. The second one is linked with the way our common 
and capitalised perception of an object or a phenomenon is made more deep-
focused and dense due to the artwork making us imagine it in an unfamiliar 
way. The aim of the device is in either way to remove the automatism of 
perception: 
In studying poetic speech in its poetic and lexical structure as well as 
its characteristic distribution of words and in the characteristic 
thought structures compounded from the words, we find everywhere 
the artistic trademark – that is, we find material obviously created to 
remove the automatism of perception: the author’s purpose is to 
create the vision which results from that deautomatized perception.28 
I think that both elements are present in Wittgenstein’s work as well. As for the 
first aspect, there are some interesting aphorisms in Culture and Value that we 
should consider (emphasis mine): 
In philosophy the winner of the race is the one who can run most 
slowly. Or: the one who gets there last.29 
 
Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the right 
tempo. My sentences are all supposed to be read slowly.30 
 
I really want my copious punctuation marks to slow down the speed 
of reading. Because I should like to be read slowly.31 (As I myself 
read.) 
                                               
26 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 20. 
27 See Shklovsky, ‘The Resurrection of the Word (1914)’, pp. 36-37. 
28 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 27. 
29 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 34. 
30 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 57. 
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This is how philosophers should salute each other: “Take your 
time!”32 
As for the second aspect, there are abundant weird examples, parables, 
descriptions and comparisons in Wittgenstein’s work. We are, for example, 
invited to imagine people apparently trading wood but where the setting of 
price is incomprehensible to us, a country that existed only for two minutes 
that was a projection of a part of England, a cave-man producing regular marks 
for himself, communication systems of builders, a child with deviant responses 
trying to follow a rule, people unacquainted with games sitting at a table 
performing the moves of a chess game, a speaking lion, and so on.33 I will 
discuss a few examples further down. My understanding is that Wittgenstein is 
here concerned with ordinary phenomena, such as understanding and meaning, 
but in ways very foreign to mainstream philosophers’ ways of addressing them. 
Many of Wittgenstein’s descriptions could, in my view, be said to have a 
defamiliarising effect that induces in us a sharpened perception of the 
phenomena being discussed. 
Interestingly, Shklovsky suggests that we draw attention to the 
difference between “prose perception” and “poetic perception.”34 In prose 
perception, the density and the texture of things vanish. Interestingly, 
Shklovsky refers to a passage in Tolstoy (Diary, 1897), one of Wittgenstein’s 
favourite writers, to illustrate his point: 
I was cleaning a room and, meandering about, approached the divan 
and couldn’t remember whether or not I had dusted it. Since these 
movements are habitual and unconscious, I could not remember and 
felt that it was impossible to remember – so that if I had dusted it and 
forgot – that is, had acted unconsciously, then it was the same as if I 
had not. If some conscious person had been watching, then the fact 
could be established. If, however, no one was looking, or looking on 
unconsciously, if the whole complex lives of people go on 
unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been.35  
For Shklovsky, art is supposed to be able to bring back the sensation of life. 
Art is, Shklovsky argues, “the crooked road, the road on which the foot senses 
                                                                                                             
31 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 68. 
32 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 80. 
33 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics (Basil Blackwell, 
1991), pp. 94, 336, 344, and the Investigations §§2, 185, 200, and p. 223. 
34 See Shklovsky, ‘The Resurrection of the Word (1914)’, p. 42 and Shklovsky ‘Art as 
Technique’, p. 20. 
35 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 20. 
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the stones, the road which turns back on itself – this is the road of art.”36 
Shklovsky stresses that the purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as 
they are perceived and not as they are known. There is for him an important 
contrast between vision and knowledge. This contrast between perception and 
knowledge is interesting on this score.37 It is pertinent here to bring 
Wittgenstein’s reminders to mind. These are, among other things, supposed to 
help us see the physiognomy of the phenomena we are examining. By my 
understanding, they speak to our perceptual capacities. Their aim is to slow 
down the perception. The goal is to create a vision, not to serve as a medium of 
philosophical knowledge.  
According to Shklovsky, Tolstoy describes things and phenomena in a 
way that makes us feel we are seeing them for the first time. One of the 
examples Shklovsky wants to draw our attention to is a short story that is told 
from the point of view of a horse. This is something, according to Shklovsky, 
that makes the content of the story seem very unfamiliar and strange. 
According to Shklovsky, there are numerous similar passages in Tolstoy. The 
following passage from Tolstoy’s short story “Strider” draws our attention to 
the institution of private property. Here is the horse speaking:  
I understand well what they said about whipping and Christianity. 
But then I was absolutely in the dark. What’s the meaning of his 
‘own,’ ‘his colt’? From these phrases I saw that people thought there 
was some sort of connection between me and the stable. At the time 
I simply could not understand the connection. Only much later, when 
they separated me from the other horses, did I begin to understand. 
But even then I simply could not see what it meant when they called 
me ‘man’s property.’ The words ‘my horse’ referred to me, a living 
horse, and seemed as strange to me as the words ‘my land,’ ‘my air,’ 
‘my water.’  
But the words made a strong impression on me. I thought about them 
constantly, and only after the most diverse experiences with people 
did I understand, finally, what they meant. They meant this: In life 
people are guided by words, not by deeds. It’s not so much that they 
love the possibility of doing or not doing something as it is the 
possibility of speaking with words, agreed on among themselves, 
about various topics. Such are the words ‘my’ and ‘mine,’ which 
they apply to different things, creatures, objects, and even to land, 
people, and horses. They agree that only one may say ‘mine’ about 
                                               
36 Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Poetika’, quoted from Richard Sherwood, ‘Viktor Shklovsky and the 
Development of Early Formalist Theory’, in Russian Formalism: A Collection of Articles 
and Texts in Translation, eds Stephen Bann and John E. Bowlt (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press) p. 30. 
37 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§ 126-129. 
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his, that, or the other thing. And the one who says ‘mine’ about the 
greatest number of things is, according to the game which they’ve 
agreed to among themselves, the one they consider the most happy. I 
don’t know the point of all this, but it’s true. For a long time I tried 
to explain it to myself in terms of some kind of real gain, but I had to 
reject that explanation because it was wrong. Many of those, for 
instance, who called me their own never rode on me - although 
others did. And so with those who fed me. Then again, the 
coachman, the veterinarians, and the outsiders in general treated me 
kindly, yet those who called me their own did not. In due time, 
having widened the scope of my observations, I satisfied myself that 
the notion ‘my,’ not only in relation to horses, has no other basis 
than a narrow human instinct which is called a sense of or right to 
private property. A man says ‘this house is mine’ and never lives in 
it; he only worries about its construction and upkeep. A merchant 
says ‘my shop,’ ‘my dry goods shop,’ for instance, and does not even 
wear clothes made from the better cloth he keeps in his own shop.38 
This passage may help us see the institution of ownership in a new light. 
Important aspects of this phenomenon remain unseen, because they are always 
before our eyes.39 There is something uncanny and upsetting about the 
perspective of the horse. The horse investigates, as it were, in a Wittgensteinian 
way the grammar and use of words, such as, “my” and “mine.” The non-human 
perspective of the horse paradoxically helps us see our own conceptual 
practices. The horse’s considerations force us to see our automatised 
conceptual practices as our own. Moreover, no knowledge, at least not in the 
ordinary sense of the word, about this institution is conveyed through the 
passage. I am more inclined to say that Tolstoy’s descriptions sharpen our 
perception. Our perception of this phenomenon is momentarily slowed down. 
My sense is that we find a great number of comparable passages in the 
Investigations. Take for instance the first paragraph of the Investigations. The 
quote from Augustine’s Confessions and his childhood recollections of what it 
is like to be initiated into language is in itself remarkable (as is the very choice 
of starting with a quotation from an autobiographical book). Yet, the picture of 
language he extracts from the passage he sums up rather flatly:  
In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: 
Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the 
word. It is the object for which the word stands. 
The question why Wittgenstein included the passage from Augustine is 
discussed in innumerable interpretations. One might think that it simply serves 
                                               
38 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, pp. 21-22. 
39 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 129. 
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as an example of the picture of language that he endeavours to undermine. I am 
more tempted to think that the passage is deliberately included to force us to 
slow down our reading and strengthen our attention to phenomena such as 
meaning, words and language learning. The summing up of the picture does 
not engage us in the same way as Augustine’s words. My understanding is that 
the inclusion of the passage, this shocking philosophical montage, could be 
considered a literary device. We feel puzzled, and perhaps even a bit lost, by 
the very perspective from which the story is told. I think it might be instructive 
to consider the very prologue of the Investigations against the backdrop of 
Tolstoy’s talkative horse and his story. This child, we are supposed to think, 
was observing the traffic of words from an external point of view. We are 
invited to imagine a child operating in a world of inert sounds and objects, 
which is a very uncanny thought.40 In my view, this first paragraph and many 
of the consecutive sections are not made to convey some pieces of 
philosophical information or theses. Rather, they facilitate finely tuned 
attention to our own ways with words. Yet, there is more to be said about the 
opening section of the Investigations on this score. In the same passage, we are 
invited to imagine the following case: 
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone 
shopping. I give him a slip marked ‘five red apples.’ He takes the 
slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then 
he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample 
opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers – I assume he 
knows them by heart – up to the word “five” and for each number he 
takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. –It 
is in this and similar ways that one operates with words. 
The situation we are asked to imagine is supposed to draw attention to the 
difference between types of words, that is, how diverse our ways with words 
are. But who is this person that the “I” sends off with a shopping list? Is it a 
child? Since the list is remarkably short, why did he have to write it out? What 
happens when the shopper returns? The little story contains no philosophical 
jargon or difficult terminology. Nevertheless, we are brought to a halt. We are 
presented with a concrete but strange situation. However, statements simply to 
the effect that words have different operative functions in language would have 
come out very flatly compared to this “curiously mechanical errand,” to 
borrow a description from Cavell.41 Once more, the desired upshot of using 
                                               
40 At a later moment, Wittgenstein points out, “Augustine describes learning of human 
language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of 
the country: that is, as if the child could already think, only not yet speak,” Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, §32. 
41 Cavell, ‘Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics’, p. 26. 
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this literary device is, in my view, to provide a kind of vision of our own 
practices that we are paradoxically not able to see since they are in front of our 
eyes all the time.  
My second example is also related to the way we fail to take the 
complexity of life into consideration. Let us consider the following remarks by 
Wittgenstein: 
What is a deep feeling? Could someone have a feeling or ardent love 
or hope for the space of one second – no matter what preceded or 
followed this second? 
What is happening now has significance – in these surroundings. The 
surroundings give its importance. And the word “hope” refers to a 
phenomenon of human life. (A smiling mouth smiles only in a 
human face.)  
Now suppose I sit in my room and hope that N.N. will come and 
bring me some money, and suppose one minute of this state could be 
isolated, cut out of its context; would what happened in it then not be 
hope? – Think, for example, of the words which you perhaps utter in 
this space of time. They are no longer part of this language. And in 
different surroundings the institution of money doesn’t exist either. 
A coronation is the picture of pomp and dignity. Cut one minute of 
this proceeding out of its surroundings: the crown is being placed on 
the head of the king in his coronation robes. – But in different 
surroundings gold is the cheapest of metals, its gleam is thought 
vulgar. There the fabric of robe is cheap to produce. A crown is a 
parody of a respectable hat. And so on.42 
These two sections contain questions, an aphorism, grammatical reminders and 
puzzling situations we are to consider. In order to make us think about the 
importance of paying attention to the surroundings, Wittgenstein urges us to 
imagine rather unfamiliar situations, for example, an isolated moment and a 
coronation in a land in which gold is the cheapest of metals and a crown is a 
parody of a headdress. Wittgenstein’s language contains no technical or 
difficult jargon. The thoughts we are supposed to entertain are demanding in 
spite of their concreteness. Many of Wittgenstein’s remarks ask us to engage 
thoughts (“thought structures”) that are not easy to absorb. His rather modest 
descriptions of the situations challenge us in a way not unlike the way 
minimalist literature does. In both cases, the reader is called upon to participate 
in the meaning of the work. Thus, instead of advancing theses, we might say 
that Wittgenstein attempts to assemble “reminders for a particular purpose.”43  
 
                                               
42 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §583-584. 
43 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §127. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, I will draw attention to a puzzling excerpt from Culture and 
Value that I take to have some bearing on my discussion:  
Engelmann told me that when he rummages round at home in a 
drawer full of his own manuscripts, they strike him as so glorious 
that he thinks they would be worth presenting to other people. (He 
said it’s the same when he is reading through letters from his dead 
relations.) But when he imagines a selection of them published he 
said the whole business loses its charm and value, and becomes 
impossible I said this case was like the following one: Nothing could 
be more remarkable than seeing someone who thinks himself 
unobserved engaged in some quite simple everyday activity. Let’s 
imagine a theatre, the curtain goes up and we see someone alone in 
his room walking up and down, lighting a cigarette, seating himself 
etc. so that suddenly we are observing a human being from outside in 
a way that ordinarily we can never observe ourselves; as if we were 
watching a chapter from a biography with our own eyes, surely this 
would be at once uncanny and wonderful. More wonderful than 
anything a playwright could cause to be acted or spoken on the stage. 
We should be seeing life itself. But then we do see this every day 
and it makes not the slightest impression on us! True enough, but we 
do not see it from that point of view. Similarly when E. looks at his 
writings and finds them splendid (even though he would not care to 
publish any of the pieces individually) he is seeing his life as God’s 
work of art, and as such it is certainly worth contemplating, as is 
every life and everything whatever. But only the artist can represent 
the individual thing so that it appears to us as a work of art; those 
manuscripts rightly lose their value if we contemplate them singly 
and in any case without prejudice, i.e. without being enthusiastic 
about them in advance. The work of art compels us – as one might 
say – to see it in the right perspective, but without art the object is a 
piece of nature like any other, and the fact that we may exalt it 
through our enthusiasm does not give anyone the right to display it 
to us. (I am always reminded of one of those insipid photographs of 
a piece of scenery which is interesting to the person who took it 
because he was there himself, experienced something, but which a 
third party looks at with justifiable coldness; in so far as it is ever 
justifiable to look at something with coldness.)  
But now it seems to me too that besides the work of the artist there is 
another through which the world may be captured sub specie aeterni. 
It is – as I believe – the way of thought which, as it were, flies above 
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the world and leaves it the way it is, contemplating it from above in 
its flight.44  
This is a long and rich excerpt, but let me say a few things about why I think it 
is important for my discussion. In Wittgenstein’s company, Engelmann seemed 
to have given voice to his frustration toward the experience in which 
something all of a sudden loses its value and attractiveness (for example, his 
own manuscripts and letters from dead relatives). In his response to the 
problem, Wittgenstein reminds us that the point of view, that is, our particular 
prejudgments or enthusiasm for something, may make something appear 
attractive and wonderful. The mystical and remarkable situation Wittgenstein 
asks us to consider is meant to elucidate exactly this phenomenon. 
Wittgenstein urges us to imagine some everyday activities, such as a person 
walking back and forth on a stage, lighting a cigarette, etc. from a peculiar 
point of view. In fact, we are supposed to imagine these activities taking place 
on a scene and the person not being aware of our presence. Actually, there is an 
interesting connection between the excerpt and the passage in Tolstoy’s Diary 
where we are asked to consider our daily activities seen from the outside.  
Moreover, what we would see, Wittgenstein suggests, would just be life 
itself. But why would we find life itself so interesting? When we normally see 
such incidents and actions, they make no impressions on us. The point of view 
is different in this case. Viewed from such a strange point of view, the person’s 
behaviour would indeed make a deep impression on us. When Engelmann 
finds his manuscripts glorious, his point of view consists of seeing his life as 
God’s work of art. From such a point of view, everything is worth 
contemplating. Engelmann is, as it were, prejudiced and subjective. Due to his 
enthusiasm, the manuscripts appear glorious. Yet, it is, Wittgenstein notes, an 
important difference between seeing something as a work of art (here, God’s 
work of art) and actually representing something so that it appears as a work of 
art. Engelmann is not representing anything (he is only enthusiastic about 
something). His enthusiasm might be infectious, but in contrast to a work of 
art, Wittgenstein suggests, there is nothing compelling about his way of seeing 
the manuscripts. A work of art, on the other hand, compels us to see the thing 
in the right perspective. In my view, Wittgenstein is interested in how our 
prejudices, our thoughts about (and attitude toward) what we see, contribute to 
what we actually see. Engelmann, for example, sees the letters for a short time 
in a particular perspective. He manages for a brief moment to see his life as an 
artwork created by God. His enthusiasm makes him see the pictures in a 
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particular way. It is from this perspective that we should understand the last 
sentences of the excerpt: 
But now it seems to me too that besides the work of the artist there is 
another through which the world may be captured sub specie aeterni. 
It is—as I believe—the way of thought which, as it were, flies above 
the world and leaves it the way it is, contemplating it from above in 
its flight.45 
For Wittgenstein, our prejudices and thoughts about phenomena constitute 
porous and personal points of view. In contrast, art is able to provide 
compelling perspectives. As for my discussion in this paper, I think 
Wittgenstein wanted to create remarks and aphorisms that had the power to 
bring about deautomatising perspectives in the reader. He was very concerned 
about his own style. Remarks in the right style may engage us and provide 
valuable perspectives. Such perspectives may sensitise us to aspects that we 
tend to ignore or overlook because of their familiarity.46 As we remember, 
Tolstoy focused on a similar problem in his Diary: “If, however, no one was 
looking, or looking on unconsciously, if the whole complex lives of people go 
on unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been.”47 
In this paper, I have suggested that we obtain a broader perspective on 
the literariness in Wittgenstein’s later writings. Shklovsky’s formalist focus on 
the literary function in discussing the literariness of prose literature is 
instructive as far as illuminating Wittgenstein’s non-doctrinal and therapeutic 
conception of philosophy goes. Many of Wittgenstein’s grammatical 
investigations and reminders may challenge our imagination and perception. 
They are, among other things, meant to help us slow down so that we think 
about the issues more thoroughly. This is often true of works of literature that 
we find worthwhile to engage as well. 
 
 
                                               
45 Toward the end of the excerpt, he mentions that the artist captures the world sub specie 
aeterni. It is instructive to compare this with remarks from Notebooks 1914-1916, in which 
Wittgenstein says that the ordinary point of view we assume is to see them from their midst. 
The work of art, on the other hand, sees the things from the outside. In such cases, the rest of 
the world constitutes a background. The artistic representation separates the thing from the 
rest of the world.  
46 Cf. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 24 and Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
§129. 
47 Quoted in Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, p. 12. 
